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1 Introduction
The impact of cyclical uctuations in government purchases on private consumption has
received considerable attention in the structural vector autoregression (SVAR) literature.
A large number of SVAR studies report a rise in private consumption following a positive
government spending shock.1 The neoclassical model of macroeconomic uctuations that
is based on inter-temporally optimizing agents and unproductive government spending
struggles to generate the positive response. A rise in government spending generates, ce-
teris paribus, a concurrent increase in the present value of lumpsum taxes. This negative
wealth e¤ect induced by the scal expansion results in the lowering of private consump-
tion, a phenomenon known in the literature as crowding-out. The New Keynesian (NK)
model that incorporates nominal rigidities into the neoclassical framework exhibits the
same wealth e¤ect that crowds out consumption after an expansionary scal shock. How-
ever, replicating the empirically relevant crowding-incomovement within the traditional
paradigm has become less challenging in recent theoretical models.
A government spending shock nanced by lumpsum taxes raises the agents incentive
to work and save more. The surge in the supply of labor causes the real wage to fall. If one
can induce the real wage to rise, the intra-temporal substitution of consumption for leisure
may be strong enough to compensate for the unfavorable wealth e¤ect. Not surprisingly,
real wage dynamics and the ensuing substitution of consumption for leisure play pivotal
roles in theoretical environments formulated to generate the rise in consumption following
the scal expansion.
Galí, López-Salido and Vallés (2007) use credit-constrained consumers who do not
smooth consumption and simply consume their after-tax wage income. A rise in the real
wage raises the consumption of the credit-constrained agent and if the share of these
agents is high enough, the positive response of aggregate consumption can be replicated.
In Monacelli and Perotti (2011) and Bilbiie (forthcoming), consumption is positively stim-
ulated due to the interaction between real wage dynamics and a utility function which is
non-separable in consumption and leisure. On the other hand, Davig and Leeper (2011)
demonstrate how the stance of monetary and scal policy alter the dynamics of the real
1An inexhaustive list includes Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Galí, López-Salido and Vallés (2007), Ravn,
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2011) and Monacelli and Perotti (2011). An exception is Peersman and Straub
(2006) who nd that consumption is mildly crowded-out in the US and does not respond signicantly in
the Euro-Area.
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interest rate and the real wage and generate the positive comovement. A vital element
that contributes to the rise in the real wage in all these environments is price rigidity in
the goods market. When there are barriers to raising the price, the prot-maximizing rm
responds to the demand shock by hiring more labor to expand production. This in turn
raises the real marginal cost or equivalently lowers the mark-up of the price over the nom-
inal marginal cost. If the expansion in labor-demand exceeds the increase in labor-supply
which accompanies the scal shock, hours worked will rise in equilibrium, raising the real
wage.
In contrast, Ravn, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (henceforth RSU) (2006, 2011) propose
an alternative mechanism to generate the positive response of private consumption, even
while adhering to an environment with exible prices.2 They construct an economy where
the government and private agents form habits over individual goods that are produced
by monopolistically competitive rms. The presence of deephabits - as opposed to the
conventional supercialhabit-formation at the level of the nal good - implies that the
demand function facing the rm has a component that depends on lagged demand. This
novel additional component gives rise to a time-varying price-elasticity of demand. The
government spending shock triggers a strong pro-cyclical movement in the price-elasticity
and hence a counter-cyclical movement in the mark-up. Since the mark-up and the demand
for labor are negative correlated, the latter increases positively stimulating the real wage.
Finally, the lower demand for leisure that follows the rise in the real wage generates a rise
in consumption.
This paper demonstrates how price rigidities hinder the rise in consumption after the
government spending shock in an economy with deep habits. Starting from a deep habits
model with exible prices, we sequentially add higher degrees of price rigidity. Simulations
of the sticky-price model suggest that as prices become less exible, the mark-up and the
real wage cease to move substantially in response to the scal shock and the crowding-in
of consumption is weakened. When the degree of stickiness is high enough, consumption
is crowded-out as in traditional forward-looking models. It is intriguing that the mark-up
becomes less counter-cyclical with increasing price stickiness and worsens the crowding-
in of consumption by government spending in the deep habits model. Other theoretical
mechanisms briey reviewed earlier, have relied on price rigidities and consequent mark-up
2Another mechanism that uses exible prices is that of Devereux, Head and Lapham (1996) where free
rm entry yields mark-up and real wage dynamics that stimulate consumption.
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counter-cyclicality to augment the positive response of consumption.
Here we illustrate that the reasons behind the crowding-out of consumption by gov-
ernment spending in deep habits economies with sticky prices can be traced to the con-
stitution of the Phillips curve. Just as in the exible price scenarios examined by RSU
(2006, 2011), a positive stimulus to government spending increases the price-elasticity and
gives the monopolist an incentive to lower the price and hence the mark-up to maximize
prots when she raises production. The mark-up continues to be negatively correlated to
the time-varying price-elasticity even in the environment considered here. However, since
prices are sticky, the expected path of infation exerts a positive inuence on the mark-up.
These two opposing e¤ects are encapsulated in the deep habits Phillips curve.
Since the price-level falls after the scal shock, ination is expected to rise to restore the
long-run equilibrium. Increasing price stickiness in the deep habits model, makes it more
di¢ cult to lower the price and the mark-up to react to the rise in price-elasticity because
the positive e¤ect of expected ination becomes more dominant. For this reason, the price
and mark-up react less counter-cyclically to government spending under increasing price
stickiness. Consequently, the real wage is less pro-cyclical and fails to deliver a substitution
e¤ect on consumption that is strong enough to overcome the negative wealth e¤ect of the
scal expansion.
In contrast, in the NK set-up, the price-elasticity of demand is constant. In this case,
the government spending shock acts more as a conventional demand shock by raising
prices. As mentioned earlier, the fall in the mark-up is a consequence of price stickiness
in this setting. When we increase price stickiness in the NK environment, the stronger
counter-cylicality of the mark-up - and the enhanced pro-cyclicality of the real wage -
weakens the crowding-out of consumption by the scal shock.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we introduce sticky prices into an
economy with deep habits and also discuss the restrictions that reduce the deep habits
model to an NK set-up with supercial habit. Section 3 calibrates the deep habits economy
and shows how increasing price stickiness worsens the crowding-in of consumption by
government spending in the deep habits economy. As a familiar benchmark, we will also
illustrate the NK case in which price stickiness alleviates the crowding-out of consumption.
We then establish that the contrasting dynamics of consumption can be attributed to the
composition of the Phillips curves in the two environments. Finally, it also evaluates
the thresholds of price stickiness at which consumption is crowded-out under alternative
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parametric congurations in the deep habits model. Section 4 draws the main conclusion.
A technical appendix documents the derivation of the key equations.
2 Deep Habits and Sticky Prices
Our objective is to demonstrate how the presence of price stickiness has di¤erent, and
somewhat counter-intuitive implications for the comovement of public and private con-
sumption in economies with and without deep habits. To this end, we formulate a simple
deep habits model which we subsequently reduce to the standard NK case with super-
cial habit-formation in consumption. Later, we will conduct numerical experiments in
both environments to examine the sequence of events that bridges a rise in government
spending to an expansion or contraction of private consumption. The simplicity of the
set-up considered helps us to distill the intuition behind the mechanisms that generate the
dynamics observed here.
We rst consider a model with good-specic habit-formation in consumption and gov-
ernment spending along the lines of RSU (2006, 2011) but with some simplications.
Unlike RSU (2006), we abstract from capital-accumulation.3 Further, current expendi-
tures on individual goods depend only on expenditures in the previous period and not on
the entire history of expenditures as represented by a habit-stock as in RSU (2006, 2011).4
We then introduce sticky prices and a monetary policy rule into the deep habits environ-
ment. Finally, we impose restrictions on the sticky-price deep habits model to reduce it
to the NK case.
Except in cases that are non-standard in the literature, we proceed to the log-linearized
versions of the equilibrium conditions without describing the non-linear equations. Steady-
state variables are denoted by an upper bar and variables that are presented as logarithmic
deviations from the steady-state are denoted by b.
Good-specic Habit-formation The characteristic that sharply distinguishes this
economy from the standard set-up (e.g. Smets and Wouters 2007) is that the public and
3Like in our case, RSU (2011) abstract from physical capital. However, unlike the model presented
here, their economy is open to international trade.
4The qualitative implications of increasing price stickiness in the deep habits model are preserved even
in a richer setting with capital-accumulation or habit-stocks. These additional results are available on
request.
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private sectors form habits over the consumption of individual goods. In standard models,
government spending does not exhibit habit-formation and the private sector typically
forms habits over the nal consumption good. Habit-formation in government spending
is equivalent to a set-up where private agents value government spending in a way that is
separable from private consumption and leisure and form good-by-good habits over public
goods provided by the government. In fact, as we shall later see in the dynamics in Section
3, as far as the rise of consumption after the scal expansion is concerned, habit-persistence
in the public sector - and not private consumption habit - is the crucial ingredient.
We will henceforth indicate the demands from the private sector and the government
by C and G respectively. Agents in the economy are indexed by j 2 [0; 1] while goods
varieties are indexed by i 2 [0; 1] : In every period t, the consumer allocates spending
on an aggregate that is dened as XC jt =
24 1Z
0

Cjit   hCCit 1
 P  1

P di
35

P

P
 1
such that
hC 2 [0; 1) and P > 1. Ci =
1Z
0
Cji dj denotes the average level of consumption of good
i in the economy while hC indicates the degree of external habit-formation. For a given
level of XC jt , optimal consumption demand for good i is obtained by minimizing total
expenditure
1Z
0
PitC
j
itdi subject to the aggregation constraint. Analogous to the private
sector, the government forms external habits over the individual goods it purchases and
faces a similar cost-minimization program for allocating its expenditures. The optimal
demands from private consumption (aggregated across agents) and government spending
for good i are given as Zit =

pit
Pt
 P
XZt + hZZit 1 where hZ 2 [0; 1) 8Z 2 fC; Gg.
Pt 
0@ 1Z
0
p
1 
P
it di
1A
1
1 
P
is the aggregate nominal price index for habit-adjusted demand.
The presence of deep habits splits demand for the good i into two components. The rst
component covaries negatively with the relative price piP and positively with aggregate
habit-adjusted demand XZ . However, the second component hZZit 1 is purely predeter-
mined by habit-formation and is invariant to changes in the relative price:5 The presence
of this price-inelastic habit-component causes the price-elasticity of demand to be time-
5 In RSU (2006, 2011), current demand depends on lagged habit-stocks that follow SZit = !
ZSZit 1 + 
1  !ZZit; !Z 2 [0; 1) and Z 2 fC; Gg : We simplify matters by setting !C = !G = 0.
6
dependent: In particular, "ZPt =
@Zit
Zit
pit
@pit
=  
P

1  hZ Zit 1Zit

: This is in contrast to
models where the rms demand function has no habit-component, i.e. hZ = 0; so that
the price-elasticity is constant at  
P
: After imposing a symmetric equilibrium, we now
express the price-elasticity in log-linearized terms.
"^ZPt =
hZ
1  hZ

Z^t   Z^t 1

8Z 2 fC; Gg (1)
As we shall see later in this section, the time-varying nature of the price-elasticity has
important implications for pricing behavior. Note also that the price-elasticities for sales
to the private and public sectors can di¤er from each other due to possibly varying degrees
of habit-persistence as well as relative inter-temporal changes in demand.
By log-linearizing the dynamic demand functions, we can link habit-adjusted aggregate
demand to the price-elasticity as follows
XZt = "^
Z
Pt + Z^t 8Z 2 fC; Gg (2)
Utility Maximization Agents derive utility from habit-adjusted consumption XC j
and disutility from labor N j . They provide labor services in a perfectly competitive labor
market at a real wage w. They have access to a portfolio of state-contingent nominal
assets Dj to smooth consumption over time: Agents are entitled to dividends Divj from
the rm and also pay lumpsum taxes T j to nance public expenditure. The representative
agent faces the following optimization program:
max
Cjt ; N
j
t ;
Djt+1
E0
1X
t=0
t
264

XC jt
1 C
1  C  
N j 1+Nt
1 + N
375 ; C ; N > 0;  2 (0; 1)
subject to the consumption aggregation constraint and the budget constraint which is
given by
1Z
0
pitC
j
itdi
Pt
+
Et

t;t+1D
j
t+1

Pt
+ T jt = wtN
j
t +
Djt
Pt
+Divjt
where E0 indicates the expectational operator conditional on the information set available
when the decision is made and t;t+1 is the nominal stochastic discount factor.
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We focus on rst order conditions describing aggregate behavior in a symmetric equi-
librium. The inter-temporal ow of aggregate habit-adjusted consumption is decided by
the Euler equation.
C^t =
1
1 + hC
EtC^t+1 +
hC
1 + hC
C^t 1   1  hC
1 + hC
1
C

R^t  Et^t+1

(3)
 is the ination rate in the aggregate price level and R is the gross nominal interest
rate:6 The labor-supply schedule is determined by the equality between the marginal rate
of substitution between leisure and consumption and the real wage.
w^t = N N^t +
C
1  hC C^t  
ChC
1  hC C^t 1 (4)
Production and Price-Setting The monopolistic rm uses labor in a linear pro-
duction function to produce its di¤erentiated good. In log-linearized terms, Y^t =

1 + fcY

N^t.
fc is a xed cost used in the technology in order to assure that prots are zero in steady-
state.
The crux of the deep habits mechanism lies in the price-setting behavior of the mo-
nopolist. We depart from RSU (2006, 2011) by introducing pricing frictions and embed
adjustment costs à la Rotemberg (1982) in the rms optimization problem. The rm
maximizes the expected value of prots by choosing the labor input, price and quantities
given the price adjustment cost as well as demand and resource constraints.7
max
Nit; pit
Git; Cit
E0
1X
t=0
tUCt
0BBBBBBBB@
pit
Pt
(Git + Cit)  wtNit + P2

pit
pit 1   1
2
Yt
+Gt

pit
Pt
 
P XGt + hGGit 1  Git

+Ct

pit
Pt
 
P XCt + hCCit 1   Cit

+ 1t
(Nit   fc Git   Cit)
1CCCCCCCCA
The degree of price stickiness is increasing in P > 0 and aggregate output Y: UC is the
marginal utility of consumption and ( ) are the Lagrange multipliers on the demand func-
tions. The real marginal cost serves as the Lagrange multiplier on the resource constraint.
Much of the discussion that follows centres on the reciprocal of the real marginal cost,
i.e. the gross mark-up of the price over the nominal marginal cost represented by : It is
hence convenient to express the real marginal cost in terms of the mark-up at the outset.
6 In equilibrium, 1=Rt = Ett;t+1
7Observe that the presence of the habit-component in demand makes the rms problem forward-looking
even in the absence of sticky prices.
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The log-linearized rst order condition with respect to the labor input imposes a neg-
ative relationship between the real wage and the mark-up:  ^t = w^t:8 In a symmetric
equilibrium, the rst order condition for satisfying demand from public and private con-
sumption is
Zt =
t   1
t
+Et
UCt+1
UCt
hZ
Z
t+1 8Z 2 fC; Gg (5)
Z measures the incremental addition of a unit of demand to the prot of the rm, i.e.
the real marginal prot, and plays a crucial role in the deep habits environment. At the
optimum, this equals the sum of prot from current sales given by  1 and the discounted
value of the prot generated from an additional hZ unit of demand obtained in the period
t+ 1 due to the habit-component. Log-linearizing Equation 5 and rearranging, we arrive
at
^t =
DH   1
1  hZ

^Zt   hZEt
h
^Zt+1 + U^Ct+1   U^Ct
i
8Z 2 fC; Gg (6)
where DH is the steady-state mark-up under deep habits. Equation 6 determines the
inter-temporal e¤ect of deep habits on the mark-up. If the present discounted value of
future marginal prots is high due to a rise in demand, the rm has an incentive to lower
the mark-up. Equivalently, lowering the mark-up in the present period ensures additional
prots in the next period.
The optimal price-setting plan is given by
P
t

t

  1

= PEt
UCt+1Yt+1
UCtYt
t+1

t+1

  1

  P

Ct X
C
t
Yt
+
Gt X
G
t
Yt

+ 1 (7)
The crucial distinction from the conventional price-setting equation (i.e. in the absence
of deep habits) lies in the dependence of price-ination on the marginal prots () and
habit-adjusted demands X().9 As noted earlier, the marginal prots covary positively with
the mark-up and future prots while habit-adjusted demand exerts a positive inuence on
the price-elasticity of demand. These implicit relations are exploited to log-linearize and
simplify Equation 7, to obtain the Phillips curve which links ination to the mark-up, the
price-elasticities and expected future prots. For the analysis of the dynamics that follows
8 In the non-linear model, the marginal product of labor is a mark-up over the real wage. Since produc-
tion is linear in labor, the marginal product is constant at unity. Hence, the marginal product does not
appear in the log-linear model, the real wage is simply the mirror-image of the mark-up.
9 In a world without deep habits, the marginal prot is given by Zt =
t 1
t
: Thus in conventional
price-setting equations, the price-ination is related to the mark-up or the real marginal cost instead of
the marginal prot.
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in Section 3, it is convenient to rearrange terms to express the Phillips curve in terms of
the mark-up instead of ination as in the standard case.
^t =
m0P
(Pm0   1)m
(Et^t+1   ^t) (8)
 mG1

"^GPt + hGEt
h
^Gt+1 + U^Ct+1   U^Ct
i
 mC1

"^CPt + hCEt
h
^Ct+1 + U^Ct+1   U^Ct
i
+mG2G^t +mC2C^t
where m, m0, mG1; mC1; mG2 and mC2 are positive constants that are functions of the
deep habit parameters.10 A positive stimulus to aggregate demand, such as an increase
in government spending, raises the price-elasticity and also generates additional prots
in the future. Both factors contribute in lowering the mark-up. However, in contrast to
the exible price environments considered by RSU (2006, 2011), since prices are sticky,
expected changes in ination play a role in guiding the mark-up. In particular, when there
is a rise in aggregate demand, the positive inuence of expected ination on the mark-up
opposes the negative impact of the price-elasticity and future prots. This additional e¤ect
will later prove crucial to understanding the e¤ects of price stickiness on the crowding-in
of consumption. By setting P = 0, we obtain the exible price scenario.
Market Clearing, Fiscal and Monetary Policy The market for labor clears when
the demand for labor equals the supply of labor from the household. Since all agents are
identical and nancial markets are complete, the state-contingent assets are in zero net-
supply. The goods market clears when output produced by the rm is absorbed by the
private and public sectors: Y^t = (1  sG) C^t + sGG^t where sG is the steady-state ratio of
government spending in output.
The government operates under a simple scal rule with its expenditure fully nanced
by lumpsum taxes. Government spending is the only source of uncertainty in the economy
and follows an AR(1) process given by G^t = G^t 1 + t such that t  N(0; G) and
 2 [0; 1):
The model is closed with the monetary authority following a rule to set the nominal
interest rate in response to both ination and the output-gap, i.e. the di¤erence between
output under sticky prices and that produced when prices are perfectly exible. M 2 [0; 1)
10See appendix for denitions of these constants.
10
governs the degree of inertia in the interest rate response.
R^t = M R^t 1 + (1  M )

^t + y
h
Y^t   Y^ Ft
i
(9)
2.1 The New Keynesian Case
The sticky-price deep habits model can be reduced to the traditional NK set-up with
supercial habit by using a few restrictions. Firstly, the demand for intermediate goods
exhibits no habit-formation so that the demand function facing the monopolist is static
and the price-elasticity of demand is constant at  P . Secondly, consumers form habits
over the nal good while government spending displays no habit-formation. Hence, habit-
persistence in the consumption Euler (Equation 3) is retained in the NK case. The most
crucial implication of these restrictions is that the habit coe¢ cients are eliminated from
the price-setting Equation 8. Movements in the mark-up are now strictly tied down to
expected changes in ination in the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC).11
^t =
P
P   1
(Et^t+1   ^t) (10)
2.2 The Mark-Up and Intra-temporal Substitution
Irrespective of whether habit-formation is good-specic or supercial, the labor-demand
condition imposes an inverse one-to-one relationship between the mark-up and the real
wage in our environment. Remember also that the real wage stimulates consumption via
the substitution between consumption and leisure in the labor-supply condition given in
Equation 4. Combining these insights, we establish a direct link between the dynamics of
the mark-up and consumption.
 ^t = N N^t +
C
1  hC C^t  
ChC
1  hC C^t 1 (11)
To understand the e¤ect of the scal shock on consumption, what is important is the
response of the mark-up. As can be observed in Equation 11, a downward movement in the
mark-up may positively stimulate consumption. If this stimulus dominates the downward
pressure on consumption exerted by the wealth e¤ect of the scal shock, consumption will
rise in equilibrium. The two set-ups described above employ di¤erent means to achieve
11 In the appendix, we list the mathematical conditions that are substituted into Equation 8 to obtain
the NKPC.
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this common end: while the deep habits model relies on the rise in the price-elasticity
and expected future prots, the NK case instead depends on price stickiness to deliver the
fall in the mark-up. However, little is known about the e¤ects of price stickiness on the
behavior of the mark-up when habit-formation is good-specic. In the following section,
we will perform numerical experiments to understand the e¤ects of price stickiness on
the link between government spending, the mark-up and consumption in the deep habits
economy. As a benchmark, we begin by analyzing the analogous dynamics observed in the
familiar NK environment.
3 Simulation
3.1 Calibration
Table 1 displays the parameter values that are used in the simulation of the deep habits
model and the traditional NK model with supercial habit in consumption. The mone-
tary policy rule exhibits a high degree of interest rate smoothing with M calibrated at
0.80 while the coe¢ cients on ination () and the output-gap
 
y

are set at 1.5 and
0.1 respectively: These values are within the ballpark of the estimates in the empirical
literature (e.g. Smets and Wouters 2007). We draw most other parameter values from
RSU (2006). The autoregressive parameter of the government spending shock () is set
at 0.90. The Frisch elasticity (1=N ) is given a relatively high value of 1.3. The utility
curvature (C) is xed at 2 and the price-elasticity of habit-adjusted demand (P ) is given
a value of 5.3. The long-run share of government spending in output (sG) is set at 0.12.
We use a di¤erent degree of habit-formation in consumption than in government spending
with hC set at 0.5, rather than imposing hC = hG = 0:86 as in RSU (2006):12 Keeping
all other parameters constant, we now increase the degree of price stickiness (P ) in both
set-ups.
3.2 Mark-Up and Consumption Dynamics
We examine the dynamics induced by a temporary increase in government purchases in
the two economies, focussing mainly on the responses by the mark-up and consumption.
12 In both exible and sticky price versions of the the deep habits model, we do not nd a determinate
solution path for values of hC exceeding 0.58, when other parameters are calibrated as in RSU (2006).
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The spending stimulus is generated by an exogenous innovation of one percent to the shock
process. The dynamic responses for the NK case are presented in Figure 1 and those for
the deep habits model are exhibited in Figure 2.
The New Keynesian Case We begin with analyzing the dynamics in a real busi-
ness cycle model with monopolistic competition (depicted in Figure 1 using thick black
lines). The mark-up (and the real wage) is now constant and its log-linearized version
that is depicted here is stationary at zero. The intra-temporal substitution e¤ect does not
overcome the negative wealth e¤ect of the scal shock and consumption is crowded-out.
What happens when we introduce sticky prices? As a rst step, we keep the adjust-
ment cost parameter P very low at about 4.3 that corresponds to a price-duration of
about one and a half quarters.13 The inexibility in price adjustment induces a downward
movement in the mark-up and strengthens the substitution of consumption for leisure.
Consequently, consumption appears to be less crowded-out by the government spending
shock than in the exible case. As we slowly increase the price adjustment cost, the
crowding-out of consumption is weakened. In the absence of additional model features
such as credit-constrained agents or non-separable utility previously used in the litera-
ture, price stickiness by itself is unable to generate the crowding-in of consumption.
The Deep Habits Case Consider rst the dynamics under exible prices (depicted
in Figure 2 using thick black lines). Unlike the NK case, the mark-up falls sharply even
in the absence of sticky prices, allowing the positive intra-temporal substitution e¤ect to
overcome the negative wealth e¤ect, stimulating consumption.14 However, as we increase
the price adjustment cost, the response of the mark-up becomes progressively dampened.
At P =26, i.e. a price-duration of roughly three quarters (depicted by a solid line with
circular markers), the downward movement in the mark-up - or equivalently the rise in
the real wage - is too mild to prevent consumption from being crowded-out.15
Why does higher price stickiness induce stronger movements in the mark-up in the NK
case while it appears to dampen its cyclicality in the deep habits model? Understanding
13At P= 4.3, the slope of the NKPC is unity, given the baseline calibration.
14Observe that the fall in the mark-up is steep to below 0.6 per cent but short-lived. The absence of
inertia is because we have not modelled the habit-stock that RSU (2006, 2011) employ (see Footnote 5).
15The precise threshold of price stickiness at which consumption is crowded out is given by P = 13:40
(see Subsection 3.4).
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these interactions is critical to contrast the consumption responses to the government
spending shock in the two environments. In the following subsection, we delve deeper into
this issue.
3.3 Crowding-In and the Composition of the Phillips Curve
Here we demonstrate that at the heart of the distinct consumption dynamics delivered
by the two models in the face of price rigidities, lies the constitution of the Phillips
curves. Intimately related to the nature of the Phillips curves, is the fact that a rise
in government spending generates opposite responses from the price-level in the two set-
ups. To di¤erentiate the variables in the two Phillips curves, we will now superscript the
variables in the deep habits and the NK cases by DHand NKrespectively. In Figure
3, we present impulse response functions of the constituents of the Phillips curves in the
deep habits and NK cases. In our discussion, we will also refer to the price and ination
dynamics exhibited in Figures 1 and 2.
We rewrite the deep habits Phillips curve in Equation 8 by expressing the mark-up as
the di¤erence between the price and the nominal marginal cost and grouping terms.
^DHt|{z}
P^DHt  \NMC
DH
t
=
m0P
(Pm0   1)m
 
Et^
DH
t+1   ^DHt

| {z }
Expected Ination Change
  mG1"^G;DHPt| {z }
Price Elasticity (G)
+ dOEDHt| {z }
Other E¤ects
(12)
where the termdOEDHt (other e¤ects) captures the cumulated e¤ects of the price-elasticity
of consumption demand and all other elements in Equation 8.
Consider rst the dynamics when P = 4:3 (indicated by dashed lines), a price-
duration of one quarter and a half. The scal expansion leads to a sharp rise in the
price-elasticity of public-sector demand (Panel ii) and hence, it is protable for the mo-
nopolist to lower the price (Panel vi) when she expands production. Ination is expected
to rise to restore the long-run equilibrium (Panel vii in Figure 2) and exerts a strong
positive e¤ect on the mark-up. The magnitudes of the impacts of the price-elasticity of
consumption sales and other elements, encapsulated in the component labelled other ef-
fects, are negligible in comparison (Panel iv). The aggregate impact on the mark-up is
mainly determined by the negative e¤ect of the price-elasticity of public sector demand
which dominates the positive inuence of rising expected ination (Panel iii). At this
juncture, the substitution of consumption for leisure is strong enough to overcome the
negative wealth e¤ect of the scal shock and consumption expands.
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Note however that the price-elasticity e¤ect is short-lived and reverses sign after a
quarter. Recall that the price-elasticity of public sector demand is dened as "^GPt =
hG
1 hG

G^t   G^t 1

. On impact, a positive shock to government spending raises current
demand with respect to lagged demand and hence increases the price-elasticity. However,
in the ensuing period, government spending is less than its value on impact and the price-
elasticity falls.16 The intra-temporal substitution mechanism is reversed and consequently,
consumption declines below trend after about two quarters.
Increasing P to 8.5, a price-duration of about two quarters, has little inuence on
movements in the price-elasticity of public sector demand. However, now it is more costly
for the monopolist to lower the price in response to the rise in price-elasticity and cannot
set the price as low as before (Panel vi). Ination is again expected to rise (Panel vii
of Figure 2), but not as much as in the previous case. Observe that the elasticity of
the mark-up to expected changes in ination is increasing in the degree of price rigidities
(equivalently, the pass-through of uctuations in the mark-up into current ination is
decreasing in the cost parameter). In particular, note from Table 1 that at P = 8:5; the
elasticity almost doubles that observed in the rst case and strengthens the positive e¤ect
of expected ination (Panel iii) on the mark-up. When we increase the cost parameter
more, the positive inuence of the expected rise in ination progressively dominates the
downward pressure from the price-elasticity on the mark-up. For this reason, the mark-up
is less counter-cyclical, enfeebling the substitution of consumption for leisure. At a price-
duration of about three quarters, the counter-cyclicality of the mark-up is too weak to
overcome the negative wealth e¤ect of the scal expansion is not overcome. Consequently,
consumption is crowded-out as in conventional forward-looking models.
In stark contrast, the price-elasticity is invariant to economic activity in the NK case.
In this set-up, the mark-up is solely determined by the expected path of ination.
^NKt|{z}
P^NKt  \NMC
NK
t
=
P
P   1
 
Et^
NK
t+1   ^NKt

| {z }
NK Expected Ination Change
(13)
In the absence of a rising price-elasticity, the monopolist has no incentive to lower the
16The reversal of sign will be delayed when the habit-stock is allowed to be extremely persistent as
in RSU (2006, 2011). In that case, the price-elasticity is given as "^GPt =
hG
1 hG

G^t   S^Gt 1

such that
S^Gt = !
GS^Gt 1 +
 
1  !G G^t; !G 2 [0; 1): A related nding is that while increasing price stickiness
worsens the rise in consumption even in the presence of inertial habit-stocks, the threshold of the price
adjustment cost required to crowd-out consumption is increasing in the persistence of the habit-stocks.
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price-level. Instead, she is better o¤ raising the price while expanding production to meet
the additional demand from the public sector. Note that a rise in the price-level and
ination from steady-state (Panels iii and v in Figure 1) implies that future ination is
now expected to be lower than current ination to restore the long-run equilibrium (Panel
vii in Figure 1). When prices get stickier, the monopolist is unable to raise the price to the
extent possible under more exible prices. Therefore, it raises labor-demand and hence the
nominal marginal cost, to produce more output. Since the rise in the nominal marginal cost
exceeds the rise in price, the mark-up falls. Thus in this scenario, the sluggish adjustment
of the price-level to the demand shock is the source of counter-cyclicality in the mark-
up. The now familiar substitution of consumption for leisure ensures that consumption
does not contract as much as in a real business cycle model. As we increase the price
adjustment cost, the gap between future ination and current ination is expected to be
smaller in absolute value (Panel vii in Figure 1). However, just as in the deep habits
model, the elasticity of the mark-up to the expected change in ination is increasing in
the adjustment cost in the NK case (see Table 1). For this reason, the fall in the mark-up
is more pronounced, i.e. it becomes more counter-cyclical. Concurrently, the real wage
becomes more pro-cyclical and consumption is progressively less crowded-out (Panel x).
In a nutshell, a key point of distinction between the dynamics of the two set-ups is that
the government spending shock lowers the price-level on impact in the deep habits model
while in the NK case, it acts as a conventional demand shock by raising prices. As price
stickiness increases, the deep habits mark-up is guided by the positive inuence of the
expected path of ination and the downward pressure emanating from the price-elasticity
e¤ect is less e¤ective. The dampened counter-cyclicality of the deep habits mark-up implies
that the real wage is less pro-cyclical and agents do not substitute consumption for leisure
as much. If price stickiness is high enough, the negative wealth e¤ect of the scal shock
prevails and consumption is crowded-out in the deep habits model.
3.4 Sensitivity to Other Parameters
Naturally, the response of consumption is also contingent on values assigned to other para-
meters. In Figure 4, we plot the threshold of price adjustment cost at which consumption
is crowded-out on impact of the scal shock, when selected parameters are perturbed (one
at a time) from their baseline calibration. In the baseline case (not exhibited), consump-
tion is crowded-out at P = 13:40 which implies a price duration of roughly two quarters.
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A higher persistence coe¢ cient on the government spending shock process strengthens the
negative wealth e¤ect on consumption. Consequently, a lower adjustment cost is required
to crowd-out consumption when the shock is very persistent (Panel i). Not surprisingly,
the consumption response is increasing in the degree of habit-formation in government
due to the strong negative e¤ect of the rising price-elasticity of public sector demand on
the mark-up. Hence, consumption responds negatively only at higher values of the cost
parameter (Panel ii). Similarly, a higher degree of habit-persistence in consumption aug-
ments the positive consumption response.17 Increasing the consumption habit raises the
consumption price-elasticity which in turn lowers the mark-up and raises the real wage
through second-round e¤ects and hence the threshold cost parameter is increasing in the
degree of consumption habit (Panel iii). A higher Frisch elasticity of labor-supply makes
consumption respond more positively to the rise in the real wage and a higher degree of
price stickiness is required to crowd-out consumption under these conditions (Panel iv).
Consumption responses to the scal shock are imperceptibly mild when the three mone-
tary policy rule parameters are perturbed (not exhibited) and the thresholds do not vary
drastically over ranges which are empirically relevant (Panels v through vii).
4 Conclusion
This paper provides a closer examination of the nexus between deep habits, counter-
cyclical mark-ups and the crowding-in of private consumption as a result of increases in
purchases by the public sector as documented by Ravn, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2006,
2011). We demonstrate that introducing price rigidities into the deep habits economy
weakens the positive response of consumption to government spending and if stickiness
is high enough, consumption is crowded-out. The crowding-out of consumption in the
sticky-price deep habits model is due to the composition of the Phillips curve, which
encapsulates two opposing e¤ects on mark-up dynamics. The presence of deep habits gives
rise to a strongly pro-cyclical price-elasticity of demand. A rise in government spending
increases the price-elasticity and gives the monopolist an incentive to lower the price and
the mark-up to maximize prots when she raises production. However with increasing
price stickiness, a second - and more conventional - channel emanates from the expected
17However, the consumption response is positive even when the consumption habit coe¢ cient is set to
zero (not exhibited) implying that it is the degree of habit-persistence in the public sector that is the vital
ingredient to obtain crowding-in.
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path of ination. The Phillips curve stipulates that ination is expected to rise after a fall
in the price-level. For this reason, the positive inuence of the expected rise in ination
dampens the downward pressure on the mark-up generated by the rising price-elasticity.
Consequently, the counter-cyclicality of the mark-up is weaker and this reects in a milder
rise in the real wage which in turn reduces the agents incentive to substitute consumption
for leisure. If the substitution e¤ect is not strong enough to overcome the negative wealth
e¤ect of the scal expansion, consumption is crowded-out by government spending as in
standard forward-looking business cycle models.
A Appendix
Steady-State Marginal Profit: In steady-state, the rst order condition for the
rms choice of quantities, i.e. Equation 5 is given by
DH   1
DH

1
1  hZ

= Z 8Z 2 fC; Gg (A1)
This condition is useful in deriving Equation 6 in the main text.
Steady-State Mark-Up: Note that (i) there are no price adjustment costs in steady-
state: P = 0 (ii) Habit-adjusted aggregate demands are given by XZ = Z (1  hZ) 8Z 2
fC; Gg and the great ratios are related as CY = 1 
G
Y
= 1 sG: Impose these conditions on
the price-setting condition Equation 7 in steady-state to get P =
1
(1 sG)(1 hC)C+sG(1 hG)G :
Use this expression to substitute out the Lagrange multipliers Z in Condition A1 to obtain
P =
1
DH 1
DH
h
(1 sG) 1 hC1 hC +sG
1 hG
1 hG
i : This expression yields the gross steady-state mark-up
DH =

P
m0

P
m0 1 such that m0 = (1  sG)
1 hC
1 hC + sG
1 hG
1 hG < 1:
Deep Habits Phillips Curve: The primitive form of the log-linearized version of
the price-setting Equation 7 is given by
^t = Et^t+1  P
P
h
C (1  sG) (1  hC)

^Ct + X^
C
t   Y^t

+ GsG (1  hG)

^Gt + X^
G
t   Y^t
i
We substitute the following conditions in the above equation to obtain the Phillips curve
in Equation 8: (i) Equations 2 and 6 together with the goods market clearing condition
(ii) Condition A1 and the expression for the steady-state deep habits mark-up. Finally,
we manipulate to express in terms of the mark-up. We dene mC1 =
(1 sG) 1 hC1 hC

P
m0 1

m
; mG1 =
18
sG
1 hG
1 hG

P
m0 1

m
; mC2 =
(1 sG)

m0  1 hC1 hC



P
m0 1

m
andmG2 =
sG

m0  1 hG1 hG



P
m0 1

m
such thatm = sG (1  hG)+
(1  sG) (1  hC) :
New Keynesian Phillips Curve: We set the habit coe¢ cients to zero in the deep
habits Phillips curve: hZ = 0 8 Z 2 fC; Gg. It follows that the log-linearized price-
elasticities are zero and m0 = mCG = 1 and mG2 = mC2 = 0: Using these expressions in
Equation 8, we recover the NKPC exhibited in Equation 10. However, note that habit-
persistence is retained in the consumption Euler in the NK model.
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 Table 1: Calibration 
SYMBOL DESCRIPTION 
Deep Habit  
(Flex. Price) 
Deep Habit  
(Sticky Price) 
NK  
(Superficial Habit) 
     
σC Utility Curvature 2 2 2 
β Subjective Discount Factor 0.9902 0.9902 0.9902 
1/σN Frisch Elasticity 1.3 1.3 1.3 
ηP Elasticity of Substitution between Goods Varieties 
(habit-adjusted demand) 
5.3 5.3 5.3 
hC   External Habit in Consumption 0.50 0.50 0.50 
hG External Habit in Govt. Spending 0.86 0.86 0 
sG Steady-state Share of Govt in output 0.12 0.12 0.12 
ρ Persistence of Govt. Spending Shock 0.90 0.90 0.90 
σG Standard Deviation of Shock 1% 1% 1% 
ρM Interest Rate Smoothing - 0.80 0.80 
φπ Interest Rate Response to Inflation - 1.50 1.50 
φy Interest Rate Response to Output - 0.10 0.10 
ߤҧ஽ு, ߤҧே௄ Implied Steady-State Mark-Ups ቀൌ 1 ൅
௙௖
௒ത
ቁ 1.2370 1.2370 1.2326 
     
ΦP Rotemberg Price Adjustment Cost    
Value  (~ Price Duration)  
Coefficient on ܧ௧ߚߨො௧ାଵ െ ߨො௧ 
in the Phillips Curve 
  
݉బߔು
ቀηܲ݉బିଵቁ௠
  ߔುηܲିଵ  
    
4.3 (~ 1.50 Q) - 2.19 1 
8.5 (~ 2.00 Q) - 4.34 1.98 
26 (~ 3.00 Q) - 13.28 6.05 
50 (~ 4.00 Q) - 25.55 11.63 
    
 
Note: ‘NK’ is the abbreviation for the New Keynesian model. The quarterly price-duration interpretation of 
the Rotemberg adjustment cost parameter is based on a comparison of the slopes of the NK Phillips curves 
under Rotemberg and Calvo price-setting. 
Figure 1: Impulse Responses to a Government Spending Shock in the New Keynesian Model 
with Superficial Habit under Increasing Price Stickiness
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Figure 2: Impulse Responses to a Government Spending Shock in the Deep Habits Model 
under Increasing Price Stickiness
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